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ABSTRACT 
A formal logical system dealing with both uncertainty (possibility) and vagueness 
(fuzziness) is investigated. It is many-valued and modal. The system is related to a 
many-valued tense logic. A completeness theorem is exhibited. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many misunderstandings about fuzzy logic (in a narrow sense, i.e. fuzzy 
logic as a symbolic logical calculus) stem from the confusion between 
fuzziness as vagueness (impreciseness) on the one hand and uncertainty as 
partial belief (probabilistic or other) on the other hand, in spite of the fact 
that this difference has been stressed by several authors. Vagueness 
concerns degrees of truth and leads to many-valued logics, whereas uncer- 
tainty concerns degrees of belief and is best formalized as a sort of modal 
logic. See e.g. [9, 5, 11]. The main difference concerns the presence or 
absence of truth-functionality. Fuzzy logic deals with fuzzy propositions 
that may have intermediate degrees of truth (related often to values 
of some quantity such as height) and is usually understood as truth- 
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functional, i.e., the truth degree of a compound formula (conjunction, 
disjunction, negation, etc.) is a function of the truth degrees of its compo- 
nents (computed using generalized truth tables). On the other hand, 
uncertainty as degree of belief about the truth of a crisp proposition is best 
understood as some measure (not necessarily probabilistic measure) on the 
set of all possible worlds (possible states, elementary events) assigning to a 
proposition p the measure of the set of all worlds in which p is true--and 
as such it is not truth-functional. We shall prefer possibility measures; and 
a possibility measure II satisfies H(A v B) = max(II(A), II(B)), but the 
possibility of A A B is not a function of H(A), II(B). This is reminiscent 
of modal logic with modalities ~ (possibly) and [] (necessarily). For most 
modal systems, O(A v B) is equivalent o ~A v ©B, but ~(A  A B) is 
not equivalent to ~A A OB. The mathematical framework to define 
semantics of modal logic--Kripke models--generalizes often to systems 
with other modalities. 
Even if formulas bear possibilities, which are numerical values, we may 
be interested not in the values themselves but in their comparison, i.e. 
investigate formulas A ~ B saying that B is at least as possible as A. 
Here <1 behaves as a modality generalizing in some sense the modality 
(possibly). The logical language using <1 is qualitative (or, we can say, 
comparative), i.e., it does not have means to express possibilities as 
numbers, but only their comparisons. This leads to interesting, well- 
defined, and natural logical systems, and the question naturally emerges if 
they are related to some classical systems of modal logic. Developing 
formal logics like ours, we show what certain and crisp statements can be 
made about uncertainty and fuzziness. A completeness result shows that 
our axiomatization completely grasps truth (1-tautologicity). And a natural 
embedding of a system of a logic of uncertainty into a more "classical" 
modal logic (both fuzzy) shows that our system fits well into the population 
of established modal logic systems, which supports our belief that the 
system is sound (well defined, adequately formalizing some aspects of 
uncertainty and vagueness). 
In [1] a qualitative possibilistic modal logic is studied and related to a 
tense (temporal) logic with finite linearly preordered time. [1] is related to 
[6]; among other things, the system QPL of [6] is shown to be incomplete 
(but complete for formulas without nested modalities), and a complete 
system is presented. A complementary paper is [3]; this paper also relates 
modal possibilistic logic to a (different) tense logic and discusses [6], but 
e.g. the above-mentioned results of [1] on incompleteness and completion 
of QPL do not occur in [3] (and various results of [3] do not occur in [1]). 
Here we analyze a logical system dealing with both fuzziness and uncer- 
tainty, which means, formally, that it is both many-valued and modal. 
Many-valued modal logics have been investigated by some authors (see [16, 
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7, 8]); this makes our investigation easier. Trying to build a system of 
qualitative fuzzy possibilistic logic, we immediately meet the problem how 
to compare formulas of fuzzy logic with respect o their possibility or, more 
generally, with respect o possibilities of worlds on which they have a given 
truth value. This can be done in various ways; we develop two of them and 
show that they are closely related to each other and also to a system of 
many-valued tense logic (with reflexive linearly preordered time). 
The reader may wonder why we speak of tense logics in relation to 
possibilistic logic. The primary reasons is, admittedly, formal: structures 
defining the semantics of possibilistic logics lead naturally to structures 
defining the semantics of various tense (temporal) logics, i.e. to structures 
where the set of possible worlds bears a (pre)order. Relating our logical 
systems formally to some well-established systems is a desirable thing, 
witnessing mathematical soundness of our systems. But in our opinion one 
may learn even more: relating possibilistic logic to tense logic may improve 
our intuitive understanding of what possibilities (of the possibility theory) 
are: one interpretation of I'I(A) is the last time moment at which A is true 
(in the infinite case, the supremum of these moments). 
We mention the paper [13], where a definition of the possibility of a 
fuzzy formula is given that is drastically different from that used in the 
present paper; this leads to a fuzzy modal logic unrelated (apparently) to 
any tense logic, but related to fuzzy variants of $5 (logic of knowledge) and 
KD45 (logic of belief). The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In 
Section 2 we elaborate the definition of our two calculi of qualitative fuzzy 
logic and prove some theorems about them; in Section 3 we introduce our 
many-valued tense logic, state a completeness theorem, and show a rela- 
tion to our fuzzy logic. Section 4 contains the main theorem, showing that 
our two systems, in spite of different semantics, have the same tautologies 
and extend conservatively to our tense logic. Section 5 summarizes our 
conclusions and presents ome additional information (including a proof of 
the completeness theorem). 
A preliminary short version of this paper appeared as [12]. Note that the 
tense logic in the present paper differs from that of [12]; see Remark 4.2 
for a comparison. 
2. TWO QUALITATIVE FUZZY LOGICS 
2.1. Values, Symbols, Formulas 
We fix n + 1 > 2--the number of truth values. Values -- {0, 1/n, 
2/n,..., 1} is the set of values. Our symbols are propositional variables, 
connectives A, V, ~ ,  --1 (conjunction, disjunction, implication, negation), 
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and a unary connective (i) for each i • Values; modalit ies will be intro- 
duced later. Modality-free formulas are built f rom proposit ional variables 
using connectives. For example, A -~ (1)A is a formula. 
2.2. Truth Tables 
We shall use Lukasiewicz's truth tables for connectives: min imum and 
maximum for conjunction and disjunction respectively, implication I(i, 
j )  = rain(l, 1 - i + j), negation N(i)  = 1 - i; for each i, the truth table 6 i 
of the connective (i) assigns 1 to i and 0 to each j =~ i. (Note that these 
connectives are in fact definable in Lukasiewicz's logic; cf. [10, 16]. How- 
ever, for technical reasons we taken them as primitive.) Most of our 
investigations are valid also for other choices of semantics of connectives, 
e.g. G6del 's  logics [10]; but we shall not rely on this. 
2.3. Kr ipke Structures 
A fuzzy possibilistic Kr ipke structure is a structure K = (W, t~-, ¢r ) 
where W is a nonempty set of worlds, I~- maps Atoms × W into Values 
(thus each atom has a value in each world), and ¢r is a normalized positive 
fuzzy subset of W, i.e. a mapping 1r : W -~ [0, 1] such that ~-(w) > 0 for 
each w and supw ~ w ~r(w) = 1 (thus " impossible possible worlds" are not 
allowed). We call 7r(w) the possibility of the world w; the possibility of a 
set X c_ W of worlds is defined as I I (X )  = sup(~-[X]) = supw ~ x ~'(w). 
We write Ilpll~ instead of IF (p ,  w) and extend a- to all Boolean 
combinations of atoms using truth tables; thus e.g. IIA /x BII~ = min(llAllw, 
[IBllw), [I(i)AI[~ = 1 iff IIAII~ = i, [l(i)Allw = 0 otherwise, etc. 
Besides fuzzy possibilistic Kr ipke structures we shall investigate also 
fuzzy tense Kripke structures (IV, I~- , < ) where W and I~- are as above 
and < is a reflexive linear preorder  of IV, i.e., < is reflexive, transitive, 
and connected: (Vw, v E WXw < v or v < w). Clearly, each fuzzy possi- 
bilistic structure (W, I~-, 7r) determines a tense structure (W, I~- , <~) 
where 
w <~ v iff 7r(w) < 7r(v) (as reals). 
2.4. Sets of Worlds 
Given W and I~ as above and a truth value i, each (modality-free) 
formula determines the set worlds(A, i) of  all worlds w such that ]]A[[~ = i 
[or, equivalently, [~(i)AI[~ = 1]. Similarly, worlds(A, >_ i) is the set of all w 
such that [[Al[w >_ i. Clearly, if we want to compare formulas according to 
their possibilities, these sets of worlds will be relevant. Thus let us 
concentrate, for a moment ,  on comparison of sets of worlds. 
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2.5. Comparing Sets of World 
If (W, 7r) is a set of worlds with a normalized positive fuzzy subset (say 
a possibilistic set), then subsets X, Y of W may be compared according to 
their possibilities: write X ~ Y if I I (X)  < II(Y). If (IF, < ) is a reflexive 
linearly preordered set, then subsets X, Y _ IF may be compared accord- 
ing to dominance: X is dominated by Y (write X ~' Y) if (Vx ~ X) (3y  
Y) (x  <y).  If we speak of dominance in a possibilistic set (W, It), we 
mean dominance on the corresponding reflexive linearly preordered set 
tense(iF, zr) = (IV, <~.). We state some easy properties of ~ ,  ~' . 
LEMMA 2.1 
(1) Both ~ and ~' are reflexive linear preorders (i.e. are reflexive, 
transitive and connected). 
(2) For any ( W, ~r ), X ~' Y implies X ~< Y; X c Y implies X ~<' Y. 
(3) For a finite (IF, 7r ) (i.e., W is finite), ~ and ~' coincide. 
(4) For some infinite (W, 7r ) ~< and ~' do not coincide. 
Proof The easy proofs are left to the reader (to prove (3), observe that 
if X and Y are finite then X~'Y  iff max X _< max Y; to prove (4) 
produce a IV, ~, X, Y such that sup(Tr[X]) = sup(It[Y]) = a, a ~ 7r[X], 
a ~ ~r[Y]; e.g. W -- X = [½, 1], 7r(w) = w, Y = X - {1}). • 
But for some infinite (W, 7r) the two preorders do coincide; here is an 
example. 
LEMMA 2.2 A set Z c_ [0, 1] is said to be isolated from below if for each 
z ~ Z there is ~ > 0 such that [z - 6, z] n Z = {z}, i.e., the only t ~ Z 
such that z - e < t < z is z itself. I f  (W, r; ) is such that ~r[W] = {Tr(w) [ 
w ~ W} is isolated from below, then the correspondingpreorders ~ and ~' 
coincide. 
(This is because for Z isolated from below, if y ~ Z, X _c Z, and all 
elements of X are less than y, then sup X < y.) 
LEMMA 2.3 There is a countable set Z c [0, 1] which is isolated from 
below and is densely ordered by the usual ordering of reals, i.e., (Vzl, 
Z 2 E Z)  ( z  1 < z z ~ (Tqz0) ( z  l < z 0 <~ z2) ). 
Proof Hint: Take all positive rational numbers in the unit interval 
whose decimal expansion is finite and contains only digits 0 and 7. • 
COROLLARY 2.1 f f  (IV, < ) is a countable reflexive linearly preordered 
set, then there is a positive normalized 7r on IF such that < is the preorder 
<~ defined by ~r and 7r[iF] is isolated from below, i.e., for (IF, i t )  the 
preorders ~ and ~' coincide. 
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2.6. Comparing Formulas 
Recall the sets worlds(A, i) and worlds(A, > i) given by a formula A 
and a truth value i. We shall introduce two binary modalities < and <~' 
such that, for each K = (W, I~- , ~-) 
IIA < BIIw = 1 iff (Vi)(worlds(A, > i) ~ worlds(B, > i)), 
IIA <' Bllw = 1 iff the same, with -<' instead of ~ . 
It is clear that IIA < BIIw and IIA <' BIIw are independent of w. In the rest 
of the paper, when IIAIIw does not depend on w, we will often simply write 
IlZll. 
If IIh < BII = 1, we say that A is at most aspossible as B; if I[h <' BII = 
1, we say that A is dominated by B. 
Remark 2.1 
(1) IIA < BII = 1 means that for each i, the possibility of A having 
value at least i (i.e. being sufficiently true, say) is at most as big as 
the corresponding possibility for B. This is more natural than a 
similar condition but for value exactly i instead of at least i [thus 
using worlds(A, i)]. Moreover, as the reader easily checks, I[A ~ BI[ 
= 1 implies IIA < nil = 1 and IIA < 'BII = 1 for the present defini- 
tion; this would fail after the modification indicated. So we keep our 
definition. 
(2) The definition of < may be expressed as comparison of fuzzy truth 
values: put, for each i ~ Values, 
o-A(i) = II(worlds(A, > i)). 
Then I[A ,~ BI[ = 1 iff (Vi)(o.A(i) < o.B(i)), and O.A, O'8 are fuzzy 
truth values (fuzzy subsets of the set of values). 
(3) As one of the referees remarked, the function O'A might be used to 
define other modalities, e.g. by (3i > O)(O'A(i) < o.B(i)). This could 
be a topic of further research. 
EXAMPLE 2.1 The table below represents a Kripke model with seven 
worlds (W = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}), two propositions p, q, and possibility 
distribution ~r. Since p is true in world 7, whose possibility is 1, we have 
o.p(i) = 1 for all i = 0, 1 3, 1; but o.q(1) = 0.6, since the world of maximal 
possibility in which q is true is world 4 and its possibility is 0.6. The reader 
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may check that IIq 4 Pll = 1 but liP < qll ~ 1 (see also below): 
P q ~- 
1 1 1 0.3 
1 2 ~ 1 0.4 
1 3 0 ~ 0.5 
4 1 1 0.6 
1 5 1 ~ 0.7 
6 1 0 0.8 
1 7 1 ~ 1.0 
1 0 ~ 1 
~rp 1 1 1 
% 1 1 0.6 
2.7. Fuzzifying: Fuzzy Modalities Defined 
Till now, we have only defined what it means for A 4 B and A 4' B to 
have value 1. Now we complete our definition of semantics of these 
modalities. This may be done in various ways; we could e.g. make the 
formulas A 4 B, A 4' B Boolean and declare them to have value 0 if they 
do not have value 1. But we prefer something more fuzzy (for reasons that 
become apparent later). Observe the following: 
LEMMA 2.4 IlA < Bll = 1 iff 
(Vi)(3j  >/) (wor lds(A,  i) ~ worlds(B, j ) ) ,  ( * ) 
and similarly for 4 ' ,  ~' . 
Proof It follows from the finiteness of Values that for each i ~ Values 
there is a j ___ i such that the set worlds(B, > i) is equivalent, with respect 
to ~<, to worlds(B, j )  (more generally, for any X, Y, X U Y is ~<- 
equivalent to X or to Y). If worlds(A, > i )~  worlds(B, > i) then 
worlds(A, i) .< worlds(A, > i) ~ worlds(B, > i) ~ worlds(B, j )  for some 
j > i. Conversely, if the condition (*)  holds, then worlds(A, > i) 
worlds(A, i') for some i' >_ i; hence for some j >_ i' >_ i, worlds(A, > i) .< 
worlds(A, i') ~ worlds(B, j )  ~ worlds(B, > i). • 
LEMMA 2.5 Note that j > i iff I(i, j )  = 1 (the truth table of implication); 
thus [IZ < B[I = 1 iff 
rain max{/(/ ,  j )  I worlds(A, i) ,< worlds(B, j)} = 1. 
i j 
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Forgiven i, max/{/(/, j)  I worlds(A, i) ~ worlds(B, j)} measures how big, 
with respect to i, is the maximalj such that H(worlds(B, j)) > II(worlds(A, 
i)). 
Note that there is always at least one j such that I I (wor lds(B, j ) )> 
II(worlds(A, i)), since for some j we have II(worlds(B, j)) = 1. The bigger 
is the maximal j satisfying the above, the bigger is the value of the 
implication I(i, j); this value is 1 iff i < j. Thus maxj{I(i, j)  I worlds(A, i) 
worlds(B, j)} may be understood as the truth value of the fuzzy state- 
ment "for some truth degree j not much less than i, II(B, j)  > H(A, j)." 
The quantity min i maxi{I( i , j )  lworlds(A , i )~  worlds(B, j)} then can be 
understood as the truth value of the statement "for each truth value i, 
there is a j not much less then i such that I I (B , j )>  I I (A, j ) ."  Yet 
fuzzier: "the truth of B is almost as possible as the truth of A." 
Similarly for dominance. 
This leads us to the following 
DEFINITION 2.1 
IIA < BII = min max{l(/ ,  j )  I worlds(A, i) ~ worlds(B, j)}, 
i j 
I[A <' BII = the same, with ~' instead of ~ . 
We can read A <~ B as "B is almost at least as possible as A," and 
A <' B as "B almost dominates A." If the value is 1, the word "almost" 
becomes uperfluous. 
1 EXAMPLE 2.2 In Example 2.1 verify that liP < qll = ~. 
2.8. The Calculi Defined 
Now we are finally ready to complete our definition of two qualitative 
fuzzy logics: 
DEFINITION 2.2 
(1) The qualitative fuzzy possibilistic logic QFL has connectives and 
truth tables as above and has the modality < (comparing of 
possibilities); its models are fuzzy possibilistic Kripke structures ( W, 
I~ , 7r ). To repeat once more, IIA < BII = 1 if for each i, the 
possibility of A having the value > i is less than or equal to the 
possibility of B having value > i. 
(2) The qualitative fuzzy dominance logic QFL' has connectives and 
truth tables as above and has the modality 4' (dominance); its 
models are fuzzy tense Kripke structures ( W, I~ , < ). (Note that 
among them are models tense((W, I~-, 7r))given by possibilistic 
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models.) To repeat: [IA <~' B[[ = 1 if for each i, worlds in which A 
has value > i are dominated by worlds in which B has value > i. 
Remark 2.2 Let us note explicitly that we allow nested occurrences of 
modalities, e.g., p < (p <1 p) is a formula. 
LEMMA 2.6 For each fuzzy possibilistic Kripke model K = ( W, IF- , 7r ) 
and each formula A of QFL, there is a finite model K' = ( W', IF-' , 7r ') 
and a surjection f of W onto W' such that, for each w ~ IV, 
I lZ l lK ,w = IIAIIg',f~w). 
Proof Let P l , - - - ,Pn be all the propositional variables occurring in A; 
an elementary conjunction (EC) is a formula of the form (il)Pl A ..- /x 
(in)pn where i1 . . . . .  i n ~ Values. Observe that in each world w exactly one 
EC has the value 1 and others have the value 0. For each w ~ W let f (w)  
be that EC true in w, and let W' = f[W] = {f(w) I w ~ W}. Clearly, W' is 
finite (since Values is a finite set) and nonempty. For each Pi, define its 
value in a w' ~ W' to be j if the formula (J)Pi is a subformula of w' 
(recall that w' is an EC), and assign an arbitrary value to propositional 
variables other than Pl . . . .  ,Pn" For each w'~ W', let 7r ' (w ' )= 
HK(worlds(w', 1)), i.e. the possibility of the elementary conjunction w' 
having value 1 in K. This defines K '  = (W', I~ ', 7r'). Now one can verify 
by induction on the complexity of the formula that for each subformula B 
of A, 
I[n]lK,w = IIBIIK,,f¢w), (1) 
IlK(WOrlds(B, i)) = IIK,(Worlds(B, i)). (2) 
In particular, if (1), (2) hold for B and C (and all i), then clearly 
liB < CIIg = liB < CIIg' (independently of w); this is the induction step 
for <.  • 
Remark 2.3 The analogous lemma holds for countable tense models 
and QFL' formulas thanks to Corollary 2.1 (and the fact that each 
countable linear order is isomorphically embeddable into the countable 
dense order without endpoints). We shall prove a weaker finiteness theo- 
rem for QFL' later (see Theorem 4.1). 
3. A MANY-VALUED TENSE LOGIC 
We are going to relate our qualitative fuzzy logics to a many-valued 
tense logic with reflexive linearly preordered time. The logic in question, 
denoted by MTL, will have the same modality-free formulas, truth values, 
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and truth tables as the logic QFL described in the previous ection; but it 
will have two unary modalities G, H (read "in all future and present 
worlds," "in all past and present worlds" respectively). 
Kripke models have the form (W, I~-, < ), where < is a reflexive 
linear preorder on W. 
The semantics of the modality G is as follows: 
IIGAIIw = in f  IlZllw,, 
W'~_W 
and analogously for H (infw,_<w). We further define FA-  -~G(~A),  
PA - -7 H(-~ A), [] A - GA A HA, ~A - --i D(-~ A). The formulas FA, 
PA, [] A,  ~A are read: A holds in some future or present world, some 
past or present world, in all worlds, in some worlds. 
Caution Observe that the semantics of the modalities is defined dif- 
ferently from [12], where we worked with strict linear preorder < . Thus, 
again, our modalities are "always from now on" and "always until now," 
and hence are hidden universal quantifications over possible worlds > w 
or < w. Hence the interpretation by infimum is very standard, and we just 
generalize usual two-valued tense logics with linearly ordered time (work- 
ing with finitely many truth values and with linear preorders instead linear 
orders; thus in one time moment here may be several alternative possible 
worlds). 
DEFINITION 3.1 A formula is called Boolean if it results from formulas of 
the form ( i )A using connectives and modalities. Clearly, if B is Boolean 
then IIBIIw is 0 or 1. 
AXIOMS 
(a) Propositional axioms. Some choice of axioms complete for the 
given propositional calculus (cf. [10]): some few axioms for implication 
and other connectives; furthermore, 
(1) V i ( i )A,  
(2) A i~j ~(( i )A  A ( j )A )  (saying that each formula has exactly one 
truth value), 
(3) ( i )A A ( j )B  ~ (rain(i, j ) ) (A A B), and similarly for other con- 
nectives V, ~ ,  -1, e.g. 
(3') ( i )A A ( j )B  ~ (1)(A ---, B) if i < j, etc.; 
(3") (1)A ~ A for arbitrary A, and also A - (1)A for A Boolean; 
(3") (A ---, (B ---, C)) ~ ((A ~B)~(A  ~C) )  for A, B, C 
Boolean. 
Note that (3") is not sound for all formulas of Lukasiewicz's logic, but 
for Boolean ones it is. (3") is one of usual axioms of the classical 
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propositional calculus, and it guarantees that for Boolean formulas we 
have full classical propositional calculus. 
(b) Modal axioms. 
(4) G(A -~ B) --* (GA ~ GB), H(A  ~ B) --, (HA ~ HB); PGA ~ A, 
FHA ~ A; 
(5) GA -~ A (reflexivity); GA ~ GGA (transitivity); 
(6) FA ~ G(PA v FA) (not branching towards the future); PA 
H(PA v FA) (not branching towards the past); 
(7) G(> i)A - (> i)GA, G(<i )A  - (< i )FA ,  H(> i )A - (>_ i )HA,  
H( < i)A - ( < i)PA (an analog of Fitting's axioms [7, 8]). 
[Note that (> i )A is V j> g(j)A etc.] 
DEDUCTION RULES of this modal logic Modus ponens, necessitation for 
G, H (e.g., "from A infer GA"), and also "from A infer (1)A." 
Caution To avoid misunderstanding, let us stress again that some 
axioms are assumed only for Boolean formulas, i.e. formulas whose syntac- 
tic form guarantees that they take only values 0, 1 in all evaluations. Only 
for such formulas do we have full propositional calculus. But all axioms 
and deduction rules are 1-sound, i.e., axioms are 1-tautologies (true in all 
worlds of all Kripke models with reflexive linear ordering), and all deduc- 
tion rules convert 1-tautologies to 1-tautologies. This is the content of the 
following lemma. 
LEMMA 3.1 All the above axioms and deduction rules are 1-sound for 
Kripke models with reflexive linearly preordered time. 
Proof (3"): [[(1)A[]w = 1 iff []A[[w = 1, [[(1)A[[w = 0 otherwise; thus 
I[(1)A[[w N [[A[[w for arbitrary A. If A is Boolean, i.e. has only values 0, 1, 
then II(1)AIIw = IIAllw. 
(4): Consider G(A ~ B) ~ (GA ~ GB). Nothing has to be proved if 
[[aAllw _< [[GBIIw, so assume [[GAIIw > []GBIIw. Let w 1, w 2 be such that 
[[GA[[w = [[A[[w~ = al, [[GB[[w = [[B[[w2 = b2; put [IAHw2 = a2. Then a 2 >_ 
a 1 >b2,  so [[GA ~GB[[w = 1-a  I +b  2_> 1 -a  2 +b 2 >_[[G(A-~B)[[w. 
Consider PGA ~ A; let a = [[A[[w. For each w' _< w, infw,, > w' I[A[[w,, _< 
a; thus [[PGA[[w <_ a. 
The proofs for the other two axioms are similar. 
(5): Consider GA ~ A.  By definition, IIGGA[Iw = infw,>w 
[[Al[w', so because w > w, IIGAIIw <_ [IA[lw. 
Cons ider  GA ~ GGA.  By definit ion, [IGGAIIw = infw,>w 
infw">_ w' IIAIIw,, By transitivity, if w" > w' and w' > w then w" >_ w, so 
IIGAIIw <_ IIGGAIIw. 
(6): Consider FA ~ G(PA V FA). Let a = I[FAllw, and suppose that 
a > 0 (otherwise nothing has to be proved). Let w 1 be such that IIFAIIw = 
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I]AIIwx , and let w 2 _> w be arbitrary. Because _< is not branching towards 
the future, there are two possibilities: w 1 _< w 2 and thus ][PA[Iw2 >- a, or 
w 2 _< w 1 and thus [[FA[[w2 -> a. In both cases, [[PA v FA[[w2 >_ a. Therefore 
[[G(PA v FA)[[w >_ a, as desired. 
The proof for the other axiom is similar. 
(7): Consider G(<_ i )A -- (<_ i)FA. We have I[G(___ i)A[I~ = 1 iff 
min~,> w [](_< i)A[[~, = 1 iff for all w' _> w, ][A[[w, _< i, iff maxw,> - w [[A[lw, 
< i, iff IIFAIIw <_ i, iff 1[(< i)FAI]~ = 1. 
Finally we prove 1-soundness of necessitation by G: if A is a 1- 
tautology, then A has value 1 in each world w of each Kripke model 
K; then also GA has value 1 in w (since it has value 1 in all w' > w from 
K). 
The rest is similar. • 
Remark 3.1 Axioms (4)-(6) are very similar to the tense logic Lin 
defined in [14]. Because we added the reflexivity axiom, the axioms (6) are 
somewhat simpler than the ones usually used ( FA ~ G( PA v A V FA ) 
and PA ---, H(PA v A v FA); see also [2]). The axioms (7) are inspired by 
Fitting [7], even if not identical with his axioms. 
THEOREM 3.1 (Completeness theorem) MTL F- A (A  is provable in our 
tense logic) iff A is a 1-tautology of MTL, i.e., A has the value 1 in all 
worlds of all Kripke models with reflexive linearly preordered time. 
The proof is a variant of the standard method of canonical models for 
two-valued tense logic (cf. [14]), and is presented in Section 5. For general 
information on tense logics and corresponding proof techniques ee [2, 4]. 
Our proof, combined with the fact that MTL satisfies the finite-model 
property (see Lemma 5.9 below), in fact gives the following 
LEMMA 3.2 A formula A is not provable in MTL if and only if there is a 
Kripke structure ( W, I~- , < ) with W finite and such that for some w ~ W, 
(< 1)A is true in w. 
The following lemma relates QFL' to MTL. 
LEMMA 3.3 For an arbitrary tense model K -- ( W, I~- , < with reflexive 
linearly preordered time and any pair A, B of formulas, 
IIA <'BIIK = II[](A ~ FB)IIK. 
Proof For each w ~ W, put /3(w) = max~,>_w IIBII~,; /3 is nonincreas- 
ing. For each i ~ Values, let 
Ji = min /3 (w)= min max l[BIIw,, 
IIAllw=i IPAIh~=i w'>_w 
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Observe that for each w, 
IIAIIw = i ~ (3w'  > w)(llnllw, = Ji) 
[if /3(w)=J i  then Ji = maXw'>_w IIBII~,; if /3(w)>Ji ,  then there is a 
w 0 > w (i.e., w 0 _> w but not w > w0) such that /3(w 0) = Ji]. We get 
worlds(A, i) ~<' worlds(B, Ji); 
and if j >Ji, then there is a w with IIAllw = i and (Vw' > w)(llnf[~, <j).  
Hence for each i, Ji is the maximal j satisfying worlds(A, i) ~' worlds(B, 
j). 
Now [In(A --> Fn)ll~ = min w I(IIAI[~, IIFnllw) = minw I(llAIIw, ~(w)) 
= min/[minll,%= i I(i, /3(w))] = mini[I(i, Ji)] = mini maxj{I(i, j )  I 
worlds(A, i) ~' worlds(B, j)} = IIA <' BII,~. • 
4. MAIN THEOREM 
In this section we show how closely related are our two fuzzy logics QFL 
and QFL' to each other and to the tense logic MTL. For each QFL 
formula do we define its QFL' variant do' and the translation do* of do into 
the language of MTL. Then we show that qb has a model iff do' has iff do* 
has. Let us make the necessary definitions. 
DEFINITION 4.1 For each QFL formula dO, let do' be a QFL' formula 
which results from do on replacing each occurrence of <~ by <1'; and let 
do* be an MTL formula which results from dp on successively replacing 
each subformula A < B by E3(A ---> FB) (in more detail, do* is do for cb 
atomic, * commutes with connectives, and (A <~ B)* is D(A* ~ FB*)). 
Remark 4.1 By "do has a QFL model" we mean the following: there is 
a Kripke structure K= (W, IW, ~)  and a world w ~ W such that 
JldollK,w = 1. Note that 1 can be replaced with any i by replacing do with 
(/)do; we have [IdollK,w = i iff [l(i)dollK,w = 1. Similarly for (< i)do etc. 
THEOREM 4.1 (Main theorem) For each QFL formula do, the following 
are equivalent: 
(1) • has a QFL model. 
(2) do' has a QFL' model. 
(3) do* has a MTL model. 
(4) • has a finite QFL model. 
(5) do' has a finite QFL' model. 
(6) do* has a finite MTL model. 
Proof (1) ~ (4) by the finiteness Lemma 2.6; (4)¢~ (5) by Lemma 
2.1(3); (5)¢* (6) by Lemma 3.3; (6)¢* (3) by Lemma 3.2; (3)¢0 (2) by 
Lemma 3.3. This completes the proof. • 
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COROLLARY 4.1 The following are equivalent: 
(1) do is a 1-tautology of QFL. 
(2) do' is a 1-tautology of QFL'. 
(3) do* is a 1-tautology of MTL. 
(4) do is 1-true in each world of each finite QFL-model. 
(5) do' is 1-true in each world of each finite QFL'-model. 
(6) do* is 1-true in each world of each finite MTL-model. 
Remark 4.2 Thus both QFL and QFL' have the finite-model property: 
a formula has a model iff it has a finite model. (Note that the mapping 
associating with each QFL formula the corresponding QFL' formula maps 
QFL formulas onto QFL' formulas.) 
We see that the mapping * makes MTL a conservative extension of QFL 
(and similarly for QFL'); do is a 1-tautology of QFL iff dO* is a 1-tautology 
of MTL. 
Let us note at this point that in [12] a different tense logic MTL* is 
used, with three basic modalities "in all future worlds," "in all present 
worlds," "in all past worlds." A similar (two-valued) logic was used in [1]; 
[3] has a two-valued logic with two modalities, one nonstrict (we would say 
"in all present or future worlds") and one strict ("in all past worlds"; but 
Boutilier does not speak of tense logics). Clearly, MTL* is stronger (more 
expressive) than MTL; in particular, MTL* does not have the finite-model 
property. (Neither the logic of Bendovfi and Hfijek nor that of Boutilier 
has the finite-model property.) Nevertheless, for (interpretations of) QFL 
formulas, both MTL and MTL* have the same strength: both extend QFL 
(as well as QFL') conservatively. 
5. APPENDIX 
We prove the completeness theorem for MTL and close with some 
remarks. 
LEMMA 5.1 The following formulas are provable in MTL: 
(11) (>_ i)A --+ ((1)(A ~ B) ~ (>_ i)B); 
(12) GB ~ (FA --+ F(A A B)); 
(13) F(> i)A =- (> i)FA for i > 0; F (> 0)A = F(true); 
(14) F(< i)A =- (< i)GAfori  < 1; F (< 1)A = F(true); 
(15) (i)GA = G(> i)A A F(i)A for i < 1; (1)GA = G(1)A; 
(16) (i)FA = G( < i)A A F(i)A for i > 0; (O)FA = F(O)A. 
Similarly for the other modalities. 
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Proof Hints: (13) and (14) follow from (7); (15) follows also from (7) 
using w (i)GA =- (> i)GA A (< i)GA and ~- G( > i)A ---, (F( < i)A 
F( i )A)  [by (12)]. The proof of (16) is similar. • 
DEFINITION 5.1 A theory is a set of Boolean formulas containing all 
MTL-provable Boolean formulas (in particular, T contains (1)A for each 
MTL-provable formula A). A Boolean formula A is provable in T (notation 
T ~- A) if it has a propositionalprooffrom members of T using only modus 
ponens (i.e., necessitation is not allowed). T is inconsistent if T ~- A and 
T ~ -7 A for Boolean A. We remind the reader that for i ~ j the formulas 
( i)A, ( j )A  are incompatible; thus for given A, a consistent theory T may 
contain at most one formula of the form (i)A. If T is consistent and 
complete, then for each A, there is exactly one i such that ( i)A ~ T. 
A theory T is maximal consistent if T is consistent and all theories T' D T 
are inconsistent. T is complete iffor each Boolean A, T F- A or T ~- ~ A. T 
is closed under provability if for each Boolean A we have that T F-A 
implies that A ~ T. 
LEMMA 5.2 Each consistent theory T has a maximal consistent extension 
T'. 
Proof By the usual Lindenbaum construction. The novice may consult 
any standard textbook of logic, e.g. [15]. • 
LEMMA 5.3 Maximal consistent theories are complete and closed under 
provability. 
Proof As usual, remembering that for Boolean theories we have full 
propositional logic, including the deduction theorem; thus if T ~ A, then 
(T ~- ~ A) is consistent. • 
DEFINITION 5.2 Let T be a maximal consistent theory; for each formula 
A, put e(A) = i iff T contains the formula (i)A. An evaluation is an e 
given by a maximal consistent theory T. 
LEMMA 5.4 I f  e is as above, then e commutes with connectives, i.e., 
e(A A B)= min(e(A), e(B)), etc.; furthermore, e (A)= 1 for each 
MTL-provable A. 
Proof We have e(A A B) = i iff (i)(A /~ B) ~ T; also the following 
formula is in T: ( j )A  A (k)B ~ (min(j, k))(A A B). Take j, k such that 
j = e(A), k = e(B); then ( j )A  m (k)B ~ T, hence (min(j, k))(A /~ B) 
T, thus i = min(j, k). • 
LEMMA 5.5 Let e, e' be evaluations. Then the following are equivalent: 
(1) for each A, e(GA) < e'(A); 
(2) for each A, e(A) < e'(PA); 
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(3) for each A,  e(A)  >_ e'(HA);  
(4) for each A,  e(FA) >__ e'(A).  
Proof Assume (1) and prove (2): since A -~ GPA is an axiom, e(A) < 
e(GPA) < e'(PA). 
Assume (4) and prove (1): Suppose e(GA)= i. Then e(F(- ,  A ) )= 
e( -, GA) = 1 - i. By (4), e(F( -~ A)) >_ e ' (~ A), so e'(--1 A) < 1 - i and 
e'(A)  > i. 
The rest is similar. • 
DEFINITION 5.3 For evaluations e, e', let R(e, e') mean that for each A,  
e(GA) < e'(A).  
LEMMA 5.6 R is reflexive, transitive, not branching towards the past, and 
not branching towards the future. 
Proof Reflexivity: We have to show that for all formulas A and for all 
evaluations e, e(GA) < e(A). Suppose that e is given by the theory T, and 
suppose that e(GA) = i, i.e. (i)GA ~ T. We know that also (1)(GA ~ A)  
T, so by (11), (> i )A ~ T, i.e. e(A)  > i. 
Transitivity: Suppose e 0 Re 1 and e 1 Re 2, where eo, el, e2 are given by 
T 0, T 1, T 2 respectively. We have to prove that for all A, eo(GA) < ez(A). 
Suppose eo(GA) = i, i.e. (i)GA ~ T 0. We know that (1)(GA ~ GGA) 
T 0, so by (11), (>  i)GGA ~ T o, i.e. eo(GGA) > i. But then e 0 Re 1 gives 
el(GA) > i, and e 1 Re 2 gives e2(A) > i, as desired. 
Not branching towards the future: Suppose e 0 R el and e0 R e 2, where 
e 0, el, e 2 are given by T 0, T 1, T 2 respectively. We have to prove that 
el R e 2 or e 2 R e~. In order to derive a contradiction, suppose that neither 
disjunct holds. Then there are A, B such that e l (A)> e2(PA) and 
el(B) > e2(FB). Suppose el(A) = a, el(B) = b. 
Then TI ~ (> a)A A (> b)B, whereas T 2 ~- (< a)PA A (< b)FB. Be- 
cause e 0 R e 1, we find T O ~- F(( > a)A A (> b)B), so by axiom (6), 
T O F- G(P( (> a)A  A (> b)B)  v F ( (> a)A  A (> b)B)) .  
Because e 0 R e2, this implies 
T 2 ~- P ( (> a)A  A (> b)B)  V F ( (> a)A  A (> b)B) ;  
in particular, by (13), T 2 t-(_> a)PA v (>_ b)FB, contradicting our as- 
sumption. The proof that R is not branching towards the past is analogous. 
LEMMA 5.7 For every Boolean formula A and consistent theory T D_ {FA}, 
there is a consistent theory T' D_ {A}. 
Proof Let T '  be just A plus the set Mtl of all MTL-provable Boolean 
formulas. If T '  is inconsistent, then Mtl ~- ~ A, so --1 A ~ Mtl; thus 
G( ~ A) ~ Mtl and T is inconsistent. • 
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LEMMA 5.8 (Valuation lemma) For all evaluations e and formulas A, 
e( FA) = max e n e' e'( A). Similarly for the other modal operators. 
Proof Suppose e(FA) = i. First, (4) of Lemma 5.5 immediately implies 
that for all e' with eRe' ,  e ' (A)  < i. It remains to show that there is an e' 
such that eRe '  and e' (A)  = i. 
We show that the theory T'  = Mtl u {(i)A} U {(>jB)B Ie (GB)  =JB} 
is consistent. Any maximal consistent extension of T'  then defines an 
appropriate '. Take B 1 . . . . .  B~ and let Jm = e(GBm)" Let T be the theory 
defining e. We have 
T F- ( i )FA /x A (jm)GBm; 
m 
thus 
T~- F ( ( i )A  /x A (>-jm)Bm); 
gn 
thus by Lemma 5.7, Mtl U {(i)A} /x {(>jm)O m [m} is consistent. By com- 
pactness, T'  itself is consistent. This finishes the proof. • 
THEOREM 5.1 (Completeness theorem) MTL ~- A iff A has the value 1 
in all worlds of all Kripke models with reflexive linearly preordered time. 
Proof =~ : By Lemma 3.4. 
: If A is not provable, then (1)A is not provable; thus (< 1)A is a 
consistent Boolean formula, so there is an evaluation e0 with e0(A) < 1. 
Define the model K = (W, I~-, _< ), where W is the set of all evalua- 
tions e such that e 0 R e or e R e 0, where R is as in Definition 5.8, < is R 
restricted to W, and It- is defined by Ilplle = e(p) for propositional 
variables p. 
Now it is easy to check by induction on the complexity of the formula, 
using Lemma 5.4 and the valuation I~mma 5.8, that for all e, B one has 
IIBIle = e(B) [we leave the (i) step to the reader]. In particular, IlAlle0 < 1. 
Moreover, by Lemma 5.6 we conclude that < is a reflexive linear 
preorder on W. This finishes the proof. • 
In order to prove Lemma 3.2, the following lemma suffices: 
LEMMA 5.9 (Finite-model property) I f  (W, I~- , < ) is a reflexiue linearly 
preordered Kripke model such that for some w o ~ W one has IIAIIwo < 1, 
then there is a finite reflexive linear~y preordered Kripke model ( W~n, IF- fin, 
-~fin) and a w' ~ Wfin such that IIAII~' < 1. 
Proof Let ~ be the closure of {A} under subformulas and single 
negations. Define for Wl, w 2 ~ W 
W 1 ~ W 2 iff for all B ~ d~, [[Bllwl = [[Bllw2. 
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Define W~n -- {[w] I w ~ W}, the finite set of equivalence classes. 
Define [w 1] _<* [w 2] iff w' 1 _< w~ for some w' 1 c [wl] , w~ ~ [w2]. Let 
~fin be the transitive closure of _<* . It is clear that -<~n is reflexive and 
connected by inheritance from _<, so it is a reflexive linear preorder. 
Finally, define Ilpl[~nl = Ilpllw for all propositional variables p ~ qb, 
[w] ~ W~n, and define ]}--fin arbitrarily for p ~ ~. Now one can straight- 
forwardly check by induction on the complexity of the formula that for all 
B ~ ~, [w] ~ Wfin , one has IIBlli~l = [IBIIw. In particular IlAIIt~0j < 1. This 
finishes the proof. • 
Remark 5.1 
(1) We have shown in the main theorem that both QFL and QFL' 
embed faithfully to MTL and presented a complete axiom system 
for MTL. Thus a formula ~ of QFL is a 1-tautology with respect o 
the semantics of QFL iff its translation ~* is provable in MTL. 
Recall that the only modality of QFL is < (binary), whereas the 
modalities of MTL are G, H (unary). The problem remains to find 
an elegant axiomatization f 1-tautologies of QFL in the language of 
QFL. (A pedestrian axiomatization is easy to obtain by reducing 
everything to Boolean formulas [in particular educing A < B to a 
formula involving only (i)A < (j)B] and applying the axiom system 
of [1].) In attacking this problem one may start by testing axioms of 
QPL: some of them are 1-tautologies of our logic (e.g. transitivity), 
but some are not [e.g. dichotomy (A < B) V (B < A)]. For example, 
is there a complete axiom system for QFL (and hence for QFL') 
whose axioms concerning modalities do not contain coefficients? 
(2) Moreover, one can investigate logics based on comparison of other 
fuzzy truth values, infinitely valued systems, and many other varia- 
tions. The purpose of the present paper is mainly to show the 
direction for future research. 
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